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Abstract
We attempt to dissolve the measurement problem using a quasi-anthropic
principle which allows us to invoke rational observers. We argue that the
key feature of such observers is that they are rational (we need not care
whether they are ‘classical’ or ‘macroscopic’ for example) and thus, since
quantum theory can be expressed as a rational theory of probabilistic
inference, the measurement problem is not a problem.
Keywords: Quantum Theory, Bayesian Probability, Measurement.
Arguably, the basic measurement problem in quantum theory is the fact that
observers don’t seem to be passive when it comes to the quantum domain. They
seem to weirdly cause things to happen. This is obviously very difficult to come
to terms with (and people have admirably tried to come to terms with it). We
believe, however, that it is not something that we have to come to terms with
and we shall outline in a moment why we don’t.
These measurement problems seem to arise when we introduce something
that is not explained by quantum theory. For example, in the orthodox inter-
pretation we introduce ‘classical’ observers, in decoherence theory we introduce
‘macroscopic’ objects, in other interpretations we invoke ‘conscious’ observers
that cause wavefunctions to collapse or properties to actualise, and in the many
worlds interpretation we say that the ‘multiverse’ splits into many ‘universes’
such that our experience is explained by the mere fact that we exist in a ‘uni-
verse’ and not in the ‘multiverse’. All these attempts to explain away the mea-
surement problem invoke a significant amount of metaphysical baggage which
is part and parcel of the problem. In the following discussion we will also intro-
duce something that is not necessarily explained by quantum theory, but that
‘something’ will have minimal spurious metaphysical baggage.
We will assume something analogous to the anthropic principle; namely we
claim that we exist and that we also try to be rational. So, instead of assuming
observers are ‘classical, ‘macroscopic’, ‘conscious’ or that they live in a ‘multi-
verse’, let us merely presume that they, like us, try to be rational. On the face
of it, one might think that ‘rational’ is as loaded a term as the others listed
but throughout this paper we adopt the term ‘rational’ only as it is used in
common parlance—we do not consider it something uniquely human, absolute
or metaphysical. We can try to define criteria of rationality that these rational
observers ought to obey. Then, perhaps, we can derive the probabilistic side of
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the quantum formalism from these desiderata thus dissolving the measurement
problem—there would be nothing ‘invasive’ about rational observers’ proba-
bilistic predictions. The probabilities that these rational observers predict will
merely be assignments that they make, and they will make these assignments
passively. We balk at the idea that there is a dualist split between the quantum
realm and the classical realm, or between the microscopic and macroscopic, or
between our universe and the multiverse, but clearly we need not balk at the
idea of some gestalts of quantum sub-systems having a certain behaviour that
results in them communicating between each other in a manner that might be
called ‘rational’. This is close to Bohr’s interpretation on the matter [2] except
that the important property of observers is not that they are somehow ‘classical’
but that they are (or try to be) ‘rational’.
Clearly, such observers, in the case of quantum theory, will not be party to
sufficient information to make an informed truth assignment where all relevant
propositions are either ‘true’ or ‘false’ (this is the Kochen-Specker theorem [3])
and instead they must make informed probability assignments. We call these
observer’s ‘partial’ to emphasise this—they are party to less information than
they would need to make informed truth assignments.
Partial observers can analyse one quantum system using its interaction with
another quantum system [1]. We cannot justify any claim that these observers
affect the world around them by ‘rationalising’. These rational agents rationalise
using their brains and they need not yet, when they are being rational, claim
that the workings of their brains affect the world at large except through their
actions. Thus these rational agents should reject any claim that they affect the
world at large merely through being ‘conscious’, ‘macroscopic’, ‘classical’ or ‘in
only one branch of the multiverse’. Thus when a rational observer ‘rationalises’
and makes predictions this is exactly all that she does. If such observers are
partial then their predictions obviously depend upon the information that they
are party to. Nor do two partial observers making different predictions cause
different things to happen—exactly all that they do is make different predictions,
presumably because they are party to different information.
However, are we skirting around a harder measurement problem? Clearly
these partial observers will affect the world at large when they go about check-
ing whether their predictions are apt. However, surely such ‘invasivity’ is un-
controversial? Partial observers are gestalts of quantum sub-systems and their
interactions with the world at large might be analysed wholly quantum mechan-
ically (from the perspective of a different partial observer). It might be that
quantum theory is merely a theory of the probabilistic predictions that rational
partial observers make in regards to the interactions between quantum systems.
As long as we presume that quantum theory is no more than this then the mea-
surement problem is dissolved. So, there is nothing to stop partial observer A
investigating the probabilistic features of the interaction between another par-
tial observer B treated quantum mechanically and the quantum system that B
is interacting with, it is merely a very complicated thing to do. However, all
predictions will always be with respect to a particular partial observer (or a set
of partial observers working intersubjectively). In principle, A can either use
orthodox or Bayesian statistics to check whether the interaction between B and
the quantum system B investigates embodies the statistical properties that A
predicts using quantum mechanics.
Similarly, can partial observers investigate the interactions between the quan-
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tum subsystems that make up other partial observers? Of course we can, there
is nothing to stop us investigating such a thing, it is, again, merely a very com-
plicated thing to do. Instead of investigating a human partial observer, one may
as well start investigating something quite small and less complex. Lets say we
investigate an ant instead1. A whole load of partial observers rationalising about
the interactions between many small quantum subsystems of an ant might be
able to come to some intersubjective agreement about the gestalt of interacting
quantum systems which make up the ant. However, there are ethical problems
because it is not clear whether the set of partial observers will kill their ant in
committing the team to finding out whether their predictions are apt.
The set of actions that observers can make which directly affect the world at
large does not include the act of rationalising. Clearly, observers can, and do,
affect the world at large while going about and checking their predictions are
apt. As long as observers only affect the world at large through their physical
(quantum mechanical) interactions then the measurement problem is dissolved.
One response to this might be that we haven’t tackled the measurement prob-
lem as it is normally expressed: in regards to there being a categorical difference
between quantum dynamics and quantum measurement. Unitary quantum dy-
namics predicts that a system should be in one state, and quantum measurement
suggests it should be in another (an eigenstate of the measurement)—the latter
supposedly not being dynamically explained by quantum theory. This version
of the measurement problem has been tackled elsewhere [4]. It is clearly not a
problem if quantum theory is regarded as a theory of partial observers’ proba-
bilistic predictions about interactions of quantum systems. Then states would
not even be well-defined except in relation to other quantum states. As such,
the difference between a unitary state (clearly an eigenstate of some measure-
ment) and an eigenstate of another measurement would not be an issue; they
are merely defined relative to different partial observers or quantum systems.
Another response might be that we haven’t solved the problem—seemingly
part of the measurement problem—that those rational observers don’t see ‘quan-
tum states’, the world around them seems rather classical. Nor have we tackled
the problem of clearly defining how a team of partial observers might come to
intersubjective agreement about the overall behaviour of a gestalt of quantum
subsystems (if they each investigate the probabilistic features of a quantum
interaction between a pair of the gestalt’s subsystems). These are technical
problems involved in defining a classical limit of quantum theory, and they are
very difficult to solve in practice. We shall not tackle them here.
Since the key property of these observers is that they seem to be rational it
is clear that we, as humans, need not be the only partial observers. We could, in
principle, work out the axioms of rationality that we use in designing a theory
of probability like quantum theory and ensure that a computer also follows
such axioms. We could also, in principle, manually teach a group of humans
or monkeys to do the same thing (without them necessarily being aware of it
of course) by ensuring they are taught to follow simple rules which manifestly
ensure that such criteria of rationality are obeyed. Thus we would ensure that
quantum theory doesn’t afford us a special place in the universe—or ensure
that there is necessarily a dualist split between those things that are ‘rational’
and those that aren’t. Our first attempt at finding such criteria of rationality
1This is not to say that ants rationalise—only that they are less complicated than humans.
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for quantum theory should follow an approach analogous to Cox’s account of
standard probability theory [5, 6] (as Cox explicitly uses such criteria). A first
attempt is given in [7, 8].
If we have a good definition of a partial observer then what are the cor-
responding observables that they measure? This is a question that Rovelli
compellingly answers in his wonderful ‘partial observables’ paper [9]—a paper
to which we pay homage here2.
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2Although all idiosyncrasies and errors in the present paper are, of course, our own.
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